Despite a recent surge in corporate activism, with firm leaders communicating about social-political issues unrelated to their core businesses, we know little about its strategic implications. This paper examines the effect of an employer communicating a stance about a prevalent social-political issue -climate changeon employee motivation, using three field experiments in two online labor market platforms. Results demonstrate that the treatment effects of taking a stance vary depending on whether the employee agrees or disagrees with the stance, showing a demotivating effect of taking a stance that employees disagree with, and no (statistically significant) motivating effect of taking a stance that employees agree with. The mechanism behind the demotivating effect is that employees who disagree with the stance feel that their employer does not share their values and beliefs, and do not identify with their employer. This study has important implications for the nascent scholarship on corporate activism, as well as the scholarship on strategic human capital management. *I thank Erin Melly for her invaluable research assistance on this project.
Introduction
There has been a surge in corporate socio-political activism in recent years, wherein firm leaders communicate stances on social-political issues not directly related to their core business (Chatterji and Toffel 2016 , Dodd and Supa 2014 . This includes twelve CEOs signing a letter to Texas Senator Greg Abbott against LGBTQ discriminatory legislation in May 2017, the CEO of Chick-fil-A making anti-samesex-marriage statements in public interviews starting in 2011, and a number of Silicon Valley CEOs making strong moral opposition statements regarding President Trump's immigration policy on Twitter, social media platforms, and in public interviews.
1 CEOs have made statements both for and against issues like climate change, gay marriage and transgender equality matters, racial issues, gun control, gender equality, healthcare, and immigration-topics that were once exclusively the domain of politicians, NGOs, and advocacy groups (Chatterji and Toffel 2016) .
Despite the increasing prevalence of employers communicating stands on social-political issues,
we know little about the strategic implications. Scholars have only recently begun to examine the impact of corporate activism on firm stakeholders, with Chatterji and Toffel's (2017) work examining the influence of CEO activism on public attitudes and consumers' stated intent to purchase, and Dodd and Supa's (2014) study of the effects of corporate social advocacy on consumer stated intent to purchase. To my knowledge, this is the first paper to examine the effect of an employer communicating a socio-political stance on revealed (as opposed to stated) stakeholder behavior. This is also the first paper to examine the effect of communicating an employer's stance about a social-political issue on a critical stakeholder: the employee.
I implemented three randomized field experiments on two online labor market platforms, Upwork and Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), to study a causal treatment effect of an employer communicating a stance about a social-political issue -climate change -on worker motivation. In each study, once workers were hired for short-term jobs, I randomly assigned whether or not they received information about their employer's intention to take a stance on climate change policy. I then observed the effect of these stance "treatments" on workers' motivation.
Two similar studies were implemented on AMT and Upwork, designed to be similar in set up for robustness and to improve generalizability of the findings. In Study 1 (AMT), workers who were informed about their employer's intention to take a stance, randomly assigned to be for, or against, President Trump's actions with respect to climate change and who disagreed with their employer's stance completed 35 percent less extra work than workers whose employers did not take a stance (the control group); while workers who agreed with their employer's stance completed a statistically equivalent amount of optional work to those whose employers did not take a stance. Given that the vast majority of the workers who disagreed with the employers' stance were in the randomly assigned, and thus exogenous by nature, "support President Trump's stance on climate change" condition, I use this condition as an instrumental variable (IV) for disagreement with the employer's stance to examine the mechanism driving the demotivating effect of disagreement. A 2SLS analysis shows that the demotivating effect is driven by workers feeling that their employer does not share their same values and beliefs, and that they do not identify with the employer. In Study 2, a similarly designed field experiment implemented on Upwork showed similar main results, with workers who were informed about their employer's intention to take a stance on the issue of climate change and who disagreed with that stance completing 80 percent less optional work than the control group, while workers who agreed with the stance completing a statically equivalent amount of optional work as the control group.
Study 3, a field experiment on AMT, adds to the first two field experiments by examining whether communicating a socio-political stance without reference to President Trump in the communication affects results. Much of the communication about socio-political stances in recent years has been in direct response to, and/or explicitly referenced, President Trump's actions. 2 As such, the language used in the sociopolitical stances in the first two studies is quite representative of socio-political stance communication in practice. Given that firms can choose whether to include or exclude mention of a potentially polarizing figure in their communication, the third study examines whether referencing President Trump in the communication results in better, or worse, motivational effects on workers. In this study, I again find no motivating effect of communicating a stance on the issue of climate change with which employees agree (with or without reference to President Trump) and find a demotivating effect of communicating a stance on the issue of climate change when employees disagree with that stance and the stance does not mention President Trump (these workers completed 27% less extra work than the control). Interestingly, the demotivating effect of communicating a stance that does not mention President Trump is greater than the demotivating effect of communicating a stance that does mention President Trump (which, in this field experiment was directionally negative but statistically equivalent to 0). This third study's results suggest that the demotivational effects of taking a stance with which employees disagree, observed in the first two field experiments, were not driven simply by reference to a polarizing figure.
2 For example, Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein directly referenced Tump's decision to leave the Paris agreement, tweeting: "Today's decision is a setback for the environment and for the US's leadership position in the world." The CEO of Johnson & Johnson, Alex Gorskystated after the 2017 Charlottesville attack that "The President's most recent statements equating those who are motivated by race-based hate with those who stand up against hatred is unacceptable and has changed our decision to participate in the White House Manufacturing Council." Sources: http://thehill.com/policy/finance/346876-ceos-revolt-againsttrump-over-charlottesville, http://money.cnn.com/2017/08/14/investing/ceos-turn-on-trump-frazier/index.html?iid=hp-stack-dom Though AMT and Upwork are settings that facilitate short-term jobs which are not typical of the traditional employer-employee relationship, attributes of these settings make them extremely valuable as settings to study the effect of communicating a socio-political stance on worker motivation. To establish a causal effect of a firm's socio-political stance on worker motivation, one would need to hold constant the many endogenous factors that could influence both a firm's socio-political stance and worker motivation.
Yet randomly assigning a company's socio-political stance across workers is a feat that is extremely challenging to successfully administer in the setting of a traditional employee-employer relationship where information is available from numerous sources and treatment-effect diffusion from treatment to control groups is likely. In these online spot market work settings, the researcher can randomly assign information about the (fictitious) employer, keeping all other potentially confounding factors that could influence worker behavior constant. The absence of information about the social-political stance of the employer available on the Internet or elsewhere ensures that workers' perceptions of a well-known firm's or CEO's social or political ideology cannot be influenced by information outside of the researcher's control. That is, workers are unable to discover anything about their employer's stance by googling the name. This also ensures that a worker's preconceived notions about the employer's stance on the issue do not confound the results. Furthermore, workers complete their work online and without interacting with each other, which reduces the likelihood of treatment-effect diffusion from the treatment groups to the control group. The use of these research settings thus avoids many of the internal validity challenges that would afflict similarly designed field experiments implemented with a well-known company (Burbano 2016 ).
There has been increasing interest in conducting field experiments within strategy research , and a critical component to the field experiments implemented in this paper (List 2009 ) is that the workers complete their work in their real-world work context and are never made aware of their participation in a study. Furthermore, by conducting similar field experiments in two separate online labor marketplace settings, each with complementary pros and cons, I bring additional robustness to the findings. Given the importance of investigating a causal relationship between an employer taking a sociopolitical stance and employee motivation (in which there are many endogenous factors that would be challenging to control for in a study using observational data across companies, for example), the pros of implementing field experiments on these online labor marketplaces outweigh the cons of examining worker behavior in a context that is not typical of that of a traditional employee-employer relationship and instead is more typical of that of workers and companies operating in the gig economy. I discuss the generatability of the setting and its implications for future work in more detail the conclusion of this paper.
This paper contributes directly to the nascent literature on the strategic implications of corporate socio-political activism (Chatterji and Toffel 2016 , Dodd and Supa 2014 and indirectly to the related, but distinct, scholarship on the influence of CEO political ideology, shown to influence the activist behavior of employees (Briscoe et al. 2014 ) and corporate social performance (Chin et al. 2013 ). This paper is, to my knowledge, the first to consider the effects of an employer communicating a stance on a social-political issue on a critical stakeholder: the employee. This paper's findings suggest that, from a strategic human capital perspective (Campbell et al. 2012a , 2012b , Coff 1997 , Foss and Lindenberg 2013 , Huselid et al. 1997 , Koch and McGrath 1996 , Pierce et al. 2013 , there are potential costs of taking a social-political stance that goes against that of a company's current employees. This paper contributes to a recent stream of literature leveraging field experiments in natural work settings to establish causal effects of different nonmarket strategies on revealed (rather than stated) employee behavior that is critical to the firm (Burbano, 2016; Tonin and Vlassopolous, 2010, 2015) . Existing work in this vein has not yet established the effects of the nonmarket strategy of focus in this paper -communicating about a socio-political stance -on employee behavior. The afore-mentioned papers that examine the effects of other nonmarket strategies such as charitable giving on productivity (Tonin and Vlassopolous 2010 , Burbano 2018 ) and willingness to accept lower salaries (Burbano, 2016) did not identify perceived value congruence and identification with the firm as the mechanism explaining the effects on worker behavior. Furthermore, they did not directly test the mechanism driving observed effects. As such, this paper improves on the methodologies employed to date and sheds light on an important mechanism behind employee reactions to a distinct type of non-market strategy; namely, the importance of perceived value congruence with the employer in explaining employees' demotivation in response to an employer communicating a socio-political stance with which its employees disagree. This paper's findings also contribute to the scholarship that has theorized on the benefits of value congruence between employees and the firm more broadly, but which has to date relied primarily on correlational survey data and not yet established a causal effect of employeremployee value congruence on employee motivation in a natural work setting (e.g., Edwards 2004, Edwards and Cable 2009; Goodman and Svyantek, 1999; Deure, 2002, Hofffman and Woehr, 2006; Kristof-Brown et al. 2005 ); a contribution of this paper to this literature. Given the setting of the field experiments, this paper furthermore has important implications for the emerging scholarship on motivating workers in the "gig" or "virtual" economy (Greenwood, Burch and Carnahan 2017 , Martins et al. 2004 , Sundararajan 2016 . From a practical perspective, these findings suggest that managers should be aware of whether their employees agree or disagree with the social-political issue in consideration and should be wary of taking a stance on social-political issues that are at odds with those of their employees.
Literature and Theory

Corporate Social-Political Activism
Corporate social-political activism is a relatively recent phenomenon. Though some have described corporate social-political activism as theoretically distinct from nonmarket strategy (Chatterji and Toffel 2017) , in which firms work to influence government policies that are related to their core businesses (Baron 1995 , Bonardi et al. 2006 , Baron 2012 , recent studies suggest that there may be a link between taking a stance on socio-political issues and stakeholder behavior such as that of consumers and the public, of import to the bottom line (Chatterji and Toffel 2016 , Dodd and Supa 2014 . This suggests that corporate social-political activism should indeed be considered a type of nonmarket strategy, given its likely implications for firm performance. Two strands of nonmarket strategy in the literature which have been mainly been treated as separate to date are strategic corporate social responsibility (CSR), which refers to corporate actions that advance a social good that allows a firm to enhance organizational performance, and strategic corporate political activity (CPA), which refers to corporate actions to manage political institutions and/or influence political actors in a way favorable to the firm (for a review, see Mellahi et al., 2016) .
Corporate socio-political activism likely falls in between, or spans both of, these categorizations.
Communication of a Social-Political Stance and Employee Motivation
Applications of the person-organization fit and value congruence literature, as well as social identity theory, suggest that an employer communicating a stance on a contentious social or political issue
should influence an employee's perceptions of and satisfaction with working for that employer which, in turn, should influence employee motivation and willingness to put forth extra effort on the job.
Value congruence between an employee and an employing firm refers to the compatibility between the values and norms of an employee and those of the employer (Chatman 1989) and is critical to personorganization fit (Kristof-Brown et al. 2005 ). Employees will more favorably consider the qualities of their employers when those qualities are in line with their values. When an employee favorably compares an employer's qualities to those of others, self-image increases (Ashforth and Mael 1989 , Dutton and Dukerich 1991 , Brockner et al. 2014 ). Higher self-image and self-concept increase the attractiveness of categorizing oneself as part of an organization and, thus, increase job satisfaction and identification with the organization (Ashforth and Mael 1989 , Brockner et al. 2014 , Dutton and Dukerich 1991 , Dutton et al. 1994 , Greening and Turban 2000 , Mael and Ashforth 1992 , which results in employee attitudes and behaviors that benefit the firm. Indeed, surveys have suggested that value congruence should influence important outcomes such as employee wellbeing (O'Reilly et al. 1991) , employee creativity (Spanjol et al. 2015) , positive attitudes towards the job and employer (Kristof-Brown et al. 2005; Cable and Judge, 1996; Amos and Weathington, 2008) , contextual performance (Goodman and Svyantek, 1999) , organizational citizenship behavior or prosocial organizational behavior (Cable and DeRue, 2002) , supporting the organization's objective and putting in extra effort on the job (Arthur et al. 2006 , Kristof-Brown et al. 2005 , Kristof-Brown and Guay 2011 , and job performance more broadly (Kristof-Brown et al. 2005; Hoffman and Woehr, 2006) .
Correspondingly, a decrease in perceived person-organization fit or perceived value congruence on the part of the employee should negatively influence such behavior.
Though survey evidence has been brought to bear in support of a positive relationship between perceived employer-employee value congruence and employee behavior that is beneficial to the firm, to my knowledge no causal evidence, and certainly none in a real work setting, has been established. 3 In theory, an employer taking a stance on a socio-political issue should causally influence employees' perceptions about value congruence and identification with their employer, depending on whether the employee agrees with the stance. In turn, this should affect workers' motivation and willingness to put extra effort on the job.
Potential Asymmetries in Employee Motivation
There are often asymmetries in the motivation and demotivation of individuals, including in the workplace. 4 As Lipman (2015) states, p. 15, "One of the central challenges for managers is that it's not especially easy to motivate employees, but it's all too easy to demotivate them." Indeed, studies in social psychology have shown that "bad is stronger than good" (Baumeister et al., 2001) , that it is easy to lose, but harder to gain, trust (Schweitzer et al., 2006) , that individuals are less motivated by positively framed incentives than demotivated by negatively framed incentives (Goldsmith and Dhar, 2013) , that it is easier to decrease intrinsic motivation than to increase it (Deci 1972) , and that individuals' performance in the context of motor behavior decreases as a result of negative stimuli, but is unaffected by positive stimuli (Wilkowski and Robinson, 2006) . Furthermore, there are numerous studies in behavioral economics that suggest that incentives intended to motivate workers can actually demotivate them and have negative unintended consequences (see Gneezy, Meier and Rey-Biel 2011 for an overview).
Taken together, this implies that it could be easier to decrease employees' willingness to put forth extra effort for an employer by communicating a social-political stance with which they disagree with than to increase their willingness to do extra work for an employer by communicating a social-political stance with which they agree.
Empirical Settings
I implement three field experiments, one on the online labor marketplaces Upwork and two on the online labor marketplace Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), to examine a causal effect of an employer 3 Experiments with undergraduate students have been conducted to examine the causal effects of perceived value congruence on some related constructs: perceived person-organization fit (Kutcher, Bragger and Masco, 2013) and on fit or of job applicant characteristics to a hypothetical job (Dineen and Noe, 2009 (Mason and Suri 2012) .
A benefit of the AMT setting is that it is possible to gather a large sample and, because completion of surveys is common on AMT, it is also a natural context in which to ask questions to begin to study the mechanisms driving results. A downside of the AMT setting is that jobs are very short, and remuneration is small, making generalizability more challenging. A benefit of the Upwork setting is that jobs are longer, for higher pay, and are thus more representative of gig and corporate work. A tradeoff of the Upwork setting is that it is uncommon to attract or hire hundreds of workers for the same job (which is common on AMT), resulting in a smaller sample size. Surveys are also rarely administered on Upwork as part of a job requirement, so to keep the job typical of other Upwork jobs, I limited the number of survey questions administered at the end of the job and did not require workers to answer these questions (completion of the survey was optional); as a result, some control variables are missing for observations from the Upwork study, but not for the AMT studies.
By implementing field experiments in both settings, I increase the robustness and generalizability of my main results, drawing from , who emphasize the value of replicating field experiments in different settings when possible. In what follows, I describe the design and results of the two similarly-designed experiments, one on AMT and one on Upwork, followed by the third AMT field experiment. IRB approval was obtained for each.
Field Experiment 1 (Amazon Mechanical Turk)
Design
Acting as a firm, I advertised a data-gathering HIT on AMT for payment of $1.00. 7 The payment amount, nature of the job, and description were, by design, constructed to be typical of other AMT jobs.
Only U.S.-based workers with a HIT approval rate of at least 90 were eligible for the job. 8 Hired workers
were taken to an external survey site to complete the HIT. Workers were given detailed instructions for the job, which consisted of gathering 10 data points from a website and completing a short survey. Workers were given a sample data-entry question and were instructed to enter an answer for feedback. They were informed that their answer was being processed, and received an additional message corresponding to one of three randomly assigned conditions. requester name, at the recommendation of our CEO) (see Figure 1 for the exact messages).
***Insert Figure 1 here*** Workers received feedback about whether their answer to the sample question was correct and what the correct answer was. Workers were prompted to enter the 10 required data-entry points, and then were asked if they were willing to complete additional data-entry points, which were optional and not required for payment. Those willing were provided 30 more data-entry queries and could provide answers to none, some, or all of them. Workers were then surveyed to gather information on demographic and other characteristics, including their perceptions about Trump's climate change policy. They were paid at the end of the job.
Sample
7 The job description was titled "Gather 10 data points from website and complete short survey." The study took place in December 2017. The fictitious name of the firm is available from the author upon request. IRB approval was obtained. 8 A HIT approval rate of 90 is a common cutoff to ensure the work is of good quality. 9 We are processing your answer. Click on "continue" after the button appears at the bottom right of this page. This should take approximately 15 seconds. Thank you for your patience.
Nine hundred U.S.-based workers were recruited on AMT for this field experiment, and 953 individuals started the job. 10 Fifty-three individuals who did not complete the HIT exited after the random assignment of conditions, and there was no statistically significant difference between the control and two treatment groups in likelihood of exiting. 11 This suggests that selection bias due to attrition is minimal.
Sixteen observations were dropped due to repeat IP addresses, suggesting that a worker may have participated in the experiment more than once; and 19 were dropped due to taking 5 minutes or less to complete the entire study. The resulting sample size is 865 workers. for the money earned from these HITs, as opposed to it being a productive use of free time or fun. This suggests that, although the payment amount received on AMT is low, the money earned on these HITs is important and relevant for these workers. There were no statistically significant differences (p > 0.10) between the mean characteristics listed in Table 1 for the treatment and control groups, except for the primary reason workers complete work on AMT, suggesting that randomization was successful and that selection bias due to observables is minimal. 12 ***Insert Table 1 To examine how taking a stance on a social-political issue that an employee agrees with, or disagrees with, influences extra work completed (compared to not taking a stance, i.e., the control group), I use employees' self-reported agreement or disagreement with President Trump's climate change policy, namely, their response to "Do you agree with President Trump's current stance on climate change?", measured on a 7-point Likert scale. Their options were (1) strongly agree, (2) agree, (3) somewhat agree, 10 AMT keeps hiring workers until the job is completed by the number of workers being sought. 11 Likelihood of not completing the entire job was 0.02 for the control group, 0.04 for the treatment group whose employer denounced Trump's climate change policy, and 0.02 for the treatment group whose employer supported Trump's climate change policy: p = 0.1357 and p = 0.9342 that the likelihood of exiting for the respective treatment groups was statistically different from that of the control. 12 Primary reason for completing work on AMT is thus included in regression analyses reported in the Results section.
(4) neither agree nor disagree, (5) somewhat disagree, (6) disagree, and (7) strongly disagree. Employee
Agrees with Company is coded 1 for individuals in Treatment Group A (employer denounces policy) whose response to whether they agree with Trump's climate change policy was "strongly disagree," "disagree,"
or "somewhat disagree," and individuals in Treatment Group B (employer supports policy) whose response to whether they agree with Trump's climate change policy was "strongly agree," "agree," or "somewhat agree." Employee Agrees with Company is coded 0 for those in the control group. Employee Disagrees with
Company is equal to 1 for individuals in Treatment Group B (employer supports policy) whose response to whether they agree with Trump's climate change policy was "strongly disagree," "disagree," or "somewhat disagree," and individuals in Treatment Group A (employer denounces policy) whose response to whether they agree with Trump's climate change policy was "strongly agree," "agree," or "somewhat agree." 
Results
Effect of Taking a Stance on Worker Motivation
Figure 2a presents the kernel density estimations for Number of Optional Data Points Completed
for the control and treatment groups; Figure 2b presents the kernel density estimations of Number of Optional Data Points Completed for 1) the control group that received no information about the company's stance, 2) the group that received information about the company's stance and agreed with the stance, and
3) the group that received information about the company's stance and disagreed with the stance. ***Insert Figures 2a and 2b here*** Table 2 reports means by condition, as well as agreement with, and disagreement with, the employer stance groups. This shows that workers who were told that the company supports Trump's climate change policy completed less optional work compared to the control, a relationship that holds with the inclusion of control variables (shown in Table 3 , Model 2: B=-2.0, p<0.10). Women completed more optional data points than men, while individuals with a college degree put forth less extra effort than those without.
***Insert Table 2 and 3 about here *** An examination of the means reported in Table 2 furthermore shows that individuals who disagreed with the stance communicated by their employer completed less extra work than the control group who received no information about the company stance, while those who agreed with the stance completed a statistically equivalent amount of extra work compared to the control. Table 4 shows that these relationships are also robust to the inclusion of control variables shown to be predictive of willingness to put forth extra effort (Models 2 and 4). Completing 3.7 data points less than the control group on average, employees whose employers took a stance with which they disagreed completed about 35 percent less extra work compared to employees whose employers did not take a stance on an issue. ***Insert Table 4 Table 5 here*** Table 6 here***
Mechanism: Perception of Shared Values and Beliefs and Identification with Employer
I would expect a lack of perceived shared values and beliefs, as well as a lack of identification with the employer, to explain the demotivational effect of taking a stance with which employees disagree. A benefit to the distribution of disagreement with the stance being so highly correlated with treatment condition (as shown in Table 5 and the corresponding writeup) is that I can use the random assignment of the Employer Supports Trump's CC Policy as an IV for disagreement with the employer since random assignment makes the treatment condition an exogenous shock to disagreement with the employer. willingness to do extra work. Models 3 and 4 show a similar relationship for identification with the employer (again, the first stage F-statistic of 33.57 is well above the threshold for a strong instrument). As would be expected, a perception that the employer shares one's values and beliefs is strongly correlated with a perception of identification of one's employer. This analysis suggests that both mechanisms are at play in explaining the demotivating effect of communicating a socio-political stance with which workers to not agree. These mediation results are robust to the use of the Baron and Kenny (1986) Table 4 . ***Insert Table 7 here*** 13 These analyses are available from the author upon request. Climate Change policy reported in the original study with those reported in the follow-up study to a different employer (to whom they would have no incentive to misreport) five months later further supports that there was likely no social desirability bias in the original sample. The mean difference in opinion between the two time periods was very small across the entire sample of 483 (an increase of 0.21 on a 7-Point Likert Scale measuring disagreement with the policy, indicating a slight increase in disagreement with Trump's climate change policy over the timeframe). The difference in opinion between the two time periods does not vary across conditions in a way that would imply social desirability bias was present in the first study.
Addressing Potential Social Desirability Bias
For workers in the Employer Denounces Trump's Climate Change policy condition, the mean follow-up opinion is statistically equivalent to the initial follow-up opinion. For workers in the control and Employer Supports Trump's Climate Change Policy groups, the change over time was positive (indicating an increase in disagreement with the policy) but statistically equivalent (p>0.10) in the control and treatment group. ***Insert Table 8 here*** Furthermore, the main results from this AMT field experiment hold if I use workers' updated responses about their perceptions of the importance of climate change include only those workers for whom I have this information. With this smaller sample and ensured lack of social desirability bias, I
again find a demotivational effect of taking a stance that the company disagrees with, and no motivational effect (statistically equivalent to the control) of taking a stance that the employee agrees with (see Appendix, Table 1 ).
Field Experiment 2: Upwork
I ran a complementary study on Upwork with a similar design as that administered on AMT to increase generalizability of, and bring additional robustness to, my findings in the first study. I used a different type of job to elicit willingness to complete extra work, namely a translation job, which is a common job on Upwork, and the job was designed to be typical of the Upwork setting. As a result, I did not ask many follow-up questions during the optional post-job survey since doing so is less common on Upwork than on AMT. The findings from this Upwork study generally support those of the original AMT study.
Design
Acting as a hiring firm, I advertised three translations jobs on Upwork: Translation from English to Spanish, Translation from English to German, and Translation from English to Mandarin. 15 The job was to translate one page of text from English to the indicated language, corresponding to 567 words of translation, for payment of $10. Each job description indicated that the employer was looking to translate numerous documents of multiple pages each and was looking to hire numerous Upworkers to get the job done relatively quickly. Interested applicants submitted a proposal on the Upwork website. All workers who submitted complete proposals and were willing to accept the offered payment amount for the job (i.e., bid amounts of $10 or lower) were hired. After being hired, all workers received a message via the Upwork communication portal that included their instructions for the job, namely to translate the first page of a document from English to the non-English language. It was noted that if they were willing to translate more than the first page of the attached document (the total document was 10 pages), this would be helpful for the employer, but that doing so was not required to receive full payment, nor would it influence their feedback ratings. 16 All workers received the same document to translate, though they were not aware of this.
The workers were randomly assigned to one of three conditions and, according to their condition, received additional information along with their job instructions. 17 The three conditions were (1) Figure 3 for the messages corresponding to each condition.
***Insert Figure 3 here*** Workers completed the job on a rolling basis and submitted their final work product (the translated document) via Upwork within one week of being hired. Upon completion of the job, all workers were paid and rated through the Upwork system. After the job was closed, workers were asked to complete an optional survey to provide the employer additional information about the pool of Upwork workers.
Sample and Randomization Balance
Two hundred and twenty-six submitted proposals were submitted for the translation jobs, and 185 of those, who met the qualifications for the job, were offered the job. 19 Seventeen hired workers dropped out of the job after random assignment of conditions. 20 The resulting sample size is 168. The follow-up survey after completion of the job was optional, and only 128 of the 168 who completed the job answered the optional survey questions after the job was completed. Table 9 reports summary statistics for the sample, by condition. There were no statistically significant differences between the mean characteristics listed in Table 1 for the treatment and control groups except for location, and disagreement about President Trump's climate change policy. Based on Upwork metrics, workers on average charged $14.47 per hour, completed about 16 previous Upwork jobs, 17 Random assignment was implemented using a random number generator in Excel, where each of the three conditions was assigned a corresponding number. 18 The conditions were designed to be similar in length, and all reference the CEO by design. 19 All applicants who submitted a relevant cover letter and were willing to accept the $10 original offer for the job (i.e., bid $10 or less) were hired. 20 Likelihood of completing the job after being hired was 0.92 for the control group, 0.91 for the treatment group whose employer denounced Trump's climate change policy, and 0.90 for the treatment group supporting Trump's climate change policy; p = 0.9085 and p = 0.7880, respectively, that the likelihood of dropping out of the job for the respective treatment groups was statistically different from that of the control.
and bid on average $9.53 for the job. 21 The majority of workers came from Latin and South America, followed by Spain, the United States, and then other regions. Based on self-reported data gathered from the optional survey, 60 percent of the workers are women, and 61 percent have a bachelor's degree or higher.
On average, workers disagreed with President Trump's stance on climate change (average 5-point Likert scale response to "Do you agree with President Trump's current stance on climate change" was 4.45, between 4= "probably not" and 5= "definitely not").
**Insert Table 9 In addition to examining the aggregate effect of taking a stance across all workers, I particularly want to examine how taking a stance on a social-political issue that an employee agrees with, or disagrees with, influences extra work completed (compared to not taking a stance, i.e., the control group). To determine whether or not the employee agrees with the stance taken by the employer, I used employees'
self-reported disagreement with President Trump's climate change policy ("Do you agree with President
Trump's current stance on climate change?" measured on a 5-point Likert scale. Their options were (1) definitely yes, (2) probably yes, (3) might or might not, (4) probably no, and (5) Mandarin Translation and German Translation are binary variables equal to 1 if the worker completed the translation in mandarin, and in German, respectively, and 0 otherwise (the third translation language was Spanish).
Results
Figure 4a presents the kernel density estimations for Number of Optional Words Translated for the control and treatment groups. Figure 4b presents the kernel density estimations of Number of Optional Words Translated for 1) the control group that received no information about the company's stance, 2) the group that received information about the company's stance and agreed with that stance, and 3) the group that received information about the company's stance and disagreed with that stance. The means for each of the groups includes in Figures 4a or 4b are reported in Table 10 . Table 10 reflects a lower mean number of optional words translated when employees disagree with the company's stance (p<0.10). When the employee agrees with the company stance, the number of optional words translated is statistically equivalent to that of the control group (p>0.10).
***Insert Figures 4a and 4b here*** ***Insert Table 10 here*** Table 11 reports OLS regression results examining the effect of each of the treatment condition on number of unrequired words translated, with Model 2 including control variables that were not wellrandomized as well as control variables that could intuitively affect employee effort included in Model 2.
Here, we see that, with the inclusion of controls, communicating to employees that the company supports Trump's climate change policy has a negative effect on number of optional words translated (B=-316, p<0.05) compared to the control group. Model 2 also demonstrates that individuals from Spain and who translated the job in Mandarin completed less optional translations on average. ***Insert Table 11 here*** Table 12 reports OLS regression results examining the effect of taking a stance the employee agrees (or disagrees) with compared to not taking a stance (i.e., the control group) on the number of unrequired words translated. Columns 1 and 2 demonstrate that when the employer took a stance on the issue of climate change and the employee agreed with that stance, the number of optional words translated was not statistically different from that of the control group wherein the employer did not take a stance on the issue (p >0.10). In Columns 3 and 4, we see that when the employer took a stance on an issue that was in disagreement with the employee's stance on the issue, the effect on number of optional words translated was negative (p<0.05 with and without inclusion of control variables). Translating an average of 268 less optional words compared to the control group, employees whose employers took a stance that they disagreed with completed 80 percent less optional translated words compared to employees whose employers did not take a stance (the control group). The magnitude of this effect is even greater with the inclusion of additional control variables in Column 4. ***Insert Table 12 here*** An examination of the average means of number of optional words translated, by condition and agreement with the employer's stance (reported in Table 14 here**
Addressing Potential Social Desirability Bias in Climate Change Opinions
Given the importance of the job appearing to be like any other Upwork job to elicit revealed preferences and behavior of workers, I again did not first ask workers' stance on Trump's climate change policy before telling them that of their employer (randomly assigned); for those who had a contrary stance on the issue, it would have seemed unrealistic for an Upwork employer to then tell them about a contrary stance. Given the likely demotivating effect, a real employer would say nothing about its company's contrary stance after learning about an employee's contrary stance in this setting, in which providing information such as this is completely voluntary and at the employer's discretion. 22 As a result, workers were asked to indicate their agreement with Trump's climate change policy after the completion of the job 22 I consulted with the founders of two start-up organizations that use Upwork for much of their human capital needs, and both confirmed that doing so did not make sense in the Upwork setting.
(and thus, after random assignment of conditions). It is thus possible that workers had the incentive to under-report their disagreement with their employer, and to over-report their agreement with their employer, on the policy. They were asked to fill out the optional survey after they were paid in full for completion of their job and rated for the job and were explicitly told at the beginning of the survey that their answers would not affect their likelihood of working with the employer in the future to mitigate this likelihood. Nonetheless, the unequal balance of climate change positions in the treatment, compared to the control groups ( Table 1 ), suggests that there was likely social desirability bias present in responses about workers' opinions about Trump's climate change policy.
To further examine this possibility in more detail, Table 2 in the Appendix reports mean worker characteristics by agree and disagree with the employer stance and compares these to the those of the control group. Those who agreed with the company stance were more likely to self-report lower income (p<0.10), to charge a lower hourly rate (p<0.10), and to bid a lower amount on the job (p<0.10) compared to the control group. This suggests that those workers who need the job more might be more likely to state that they agree with the company stance than those who do not. Those from Latin and South American were more likely to agree with the company stance (p<0.10), while those from Spain are less likely to agree with the company stance (p<0.01).
This suggests that there was indeed likely some social desirability bias in workers' self-reported opinions about the issue of climate change towards the direction of that of their employers, which would imply that the results presented in this Upwork study are likely overstated. This could partly explain the difference in magnitude of effects between the first AMT study (a 35% decrease when the employee disagrees with the employer stance versus the control) and this Upwork study (an 80% decrease when the employee disagrees with the employer stance versus the control). If only those who strongly disagree with the employer are coded as disagreeing in the Upwork study, we would indeed expect to see a stronger demotivational effect on extra effort put forth.
Field Experiment 3 (Amazon Mechanical Turk): Does Referencing Trump Matter?
The treatment language used to describe the employer's social-political stance in the first two field experiments included reference to President Trump. This is quite characteristic of many firms' To help inform whether firms are better off referencing or not referencing President Trump in their communications about such stances, I ran a third field experiment on AMT. This field experiment was similar to that of the first AMT experiment but varied whether treatment conditions included language about President Trump. It also ensured no social desirability bias in employees' climate change opinion responses by surveying workers first and then, under the cover of a different employer, hiring them two weeks later to complete the same job as that of the first AMT experiment and assigning them to social-political stance treatments during that job (and thus, two weeks after capturing their climate change opinions under the cover of a different employer). Random assignment was stratified by workers' previously-disclosed opinions about climate change.
Design
I advertised a survey completion HIT on AMT for payment of $1.00. 2000 workers were hired to complete this survey, which included questions about their opinions about AMT as well as numerous policy issues, including gun control, immigration, and climate change. These same 2000 workers were contacted 2 weeks later by a different employer and informed that they pre-qualified for a data-entry HIT. 24 About half (1053) of the surveyed 2000 workers completed the data entry job. This data entry job was identical to that of Study 1, with a few exceptions. First, random assignment of conditions was stratified by worker opinions on climate change. That is, workers were grouped into pro-climate change, neutral about climate change, and anti-climate change categories based on their responses to the pre-job survey two weeks earlier, and random assignment of conditions was stratified within each of these groups. Second, workers were not asked opinion questions at the end of the job (since they were asked for demographic and opinion questions during the initial survey). Third, this study had four, instead of two, treatment conditions.
In this field experiment, workers were randomly assigned to one of five conditions. (1) Figure 5 for the exact messages).
***Insert Figure 5 here***
Sample and Randomization Balance
Thirty-eight individuals did not complete the job. Fifteen observations were dropped due to taking less than 2 minutes to complete the initial survey, and 20 observations were dropped due to repeat IP addresses, suggesting that they may have taken the study more than once. The resulting sample size is 980 workers. Table 15 presents summary statistics for workers in the sample, by condition. There were no statistically significant differences (p > 0.10) between the mean characteristics listed in Table 14 for the treatment and control groups, except for number of HITs per week, HIT approval rate, and age. This suggests that randomization was successful and that selection bias due to observables is minimal. ***Insert is coded 1 for individuals in Treatment Group A (employer denounces policy) whose response to whether they agree with Trump's climate change policy was "strongly disagree," "disagree," or "somewhat disagree," and individuals in Treatment Group B (employer supports policy) whose response to whether they agree with Trump's climate change policy was "strongly agree," "agree," or "somewhat agree."
Employee Agrees with Company Stance_Trump is coded 0 for those in the control group. Employee
Disagrees with Company Stance_Trump is equal to 1 for individuals in Treatment Group B (employer supports policy) whose response to whether they agree with Trump's climate change policy was "strongly disagree," "disagree," or "somewhat disagree," and individuals in Treatment Group A (employer denounces policy) whose response to whether they agree with Trump's climate change policy was "strongly agree," 
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The responses to these statements were averaged to conduct an index to represent whether the worker believes that climate change is an important issue, using 7-point Likert scale responses (1=strongly agree, 7=strongly disagree): (1) "Climate change is a pressing issue, and it is critical that we slow down and mitigate the effects of climate change." (reverse-coded) (2) "'I think there are assumptions made that because the climate is warming, that that necessarily is a bad thing. Do we really know what the ideal surface temperature should be in the year 2100, in the year 2018? That is fairly arrogant, for us to think we know exactly what it should be in 2100.' --Scott Pruit, Head of the Environmental Protection Agency" (3) "'...Climate change is real -and we need to fight it with everything we have.' --Elizabeth Warren" (reverse-coded). Table 16 . ***Insert Figures 6a and 6b here*** ***Insert Table 16 here*** Table 17 presents OLS regression results. It shows that workers who were told that the company believes that climate change is important, including reference to President Trump in the language, completed 2.2 less optional data points than the control group (Model 1), and that this relationship holds with the inclusion of control variables (Model 2). Model 2 also shows that individuals with a college degree completed less extra work, while older individuals, those who completed more HITs in the past, and those who voted for a third-party option in the most recent US presidential election, completed more. ***Insert Table 17 here *** Table 18 shows that when employee disagreed with their employer's stance and no language was included about President Trump in the communication, workers completed 26% less extra work compared to the control (B=-2.1, p<0.10 with and without inclusion of controls). This suggests that the demotivating effect of communicating a socio-political stance that employees disagree with persists even when the communication does not include reference to President Trump. Interestingly, in this field experiment, when the employee disagreed with the employer stance and that stance did include reference to President Trump, the effect on extra work completed, though directionally negative, was not statistically significantly different from zero. The demotivating effect is greater when the communication about a stance with which employees disagree does not include reference to President Trump than when it does. When the employee agreed with the stance of the employer, the effect on extra work completed was not statistically significantly different from that of the control, whether the language included reference to President Trump or did not. ***Insert Table 18 about here*** Table 19 examines reflects interactions of the treatment conditions with employee opinions about climate change. Model 1 shows that when the employee did not agree with Trump's stance on climate change, the employer stating that it supports Trump's stance on climate change had a demotivational effect on extra effort put forth (B=-3.1, p<0.10). Model 3 shows that this effect holds with the inclusion of controls. Models 2 and 4 show that, employees who believe that climate change is important are more (negatively) responsive to a stance treatment wherein the employee believes that climate change is not important (without inclusion of reference to President Trump in the language) than those who believe that climate change is not important (B=-5.4, p<0.10, with and without controls). ***Insert Table 19 about here***
Discussion and Conclusions
The importance of human capital to organizational success has been well-established (Campbell et al. 2012a , 2012b , Coff 1997 , Foss and Lindenberg 2013 , Huselid et al. 1997 , Koch and McGrath 1996 , Rider and Tan 2015 . This paper shows that communicating a social-political stance on an issue can influence employee motivation, and that this varies notably by whether the employee agrees or disagrees with the stance. I find evidence that communicating a social-political stance with which employees disagree has a demotivating effect, but that communicating a social-political stance with which employees agree has no motivating effect. As the first paper, to my knowledge, to consider the strategic implications of the burgeoning phenomenon of corporate activism on a critical internal stakeholder -the employee -this paper contributes to the nascent scholarship on the strategic implications of CEOs and corporations taking stands on social-political issues outside the realm of their core businesses (Chatterji and Toffel 2016 , Dodd and Supa 2014 . The results of this paper highlight the risks of having an employee population that does not share the social-political values of the CEO and firm if a company chooses to take a stance on a socialpolitical issue. This is in line with, and contributes causal field evidence to, research that has to date used lab and survey evidence to demonstrate the benefits of value congruence between employees and the firm more broadly (e.g., Edwards 2004, Edwards and Cable 2009; Goodman and Svyantek, 1999; Deure, 2002, Hofffman and Woehr, 2006; Kristof-Brown et al. 2005) . This paper suggests that social-political value congruence may be an important type of "value" in person-organization fit as well, and that there are potential asymmetries in the influence of perceived value-congruence on behavior. Future work can explore the extent to which an employer's social-political values influence perceptions of an organization's identity (Hsu and Hannan, 2005) amongst external constituents (Hsu and Elsbach, 2013) .
As with any field experiment in a given setting, it is important to note potential limitations of the generalizability of the results to other settings. This paper examined the effect of an employer taking a stance on a social-political issue on employees' motivation while completing short-term jobs for small amounts of pay. The fact that the results were generally robust to three field experiments across two settings (AMT and Upwork)-to a job of 10 minutes in duration and 1 week in duration, for payment of $1 and for ten times that payment amount ($10), for U.S.-based workers only and workers not restricted to the United States -improves the paper's generalizability. As the first paper, to my knowledge, to examine the effect of communicating a social-political stance on the behavior of an important stakeholder, the employee, and doing so in a manner that sheds light of a causal effect on revealed (rather than stated), behavior, the studies in this paper represent an important first step in understanding the implications of communicating such stances on human capital. Future work that examines whether similar effects hold for jobs that are longer term in nature and in-house will be important complements to this research. Additionally, I examined the effect of an employer taking a stand on one social-political issue in this study: climate change policy. Future work could explore how effects vary for different types of social-political stances.
Online labor market platforms provide important benefits as a field experimental setting in which one examines effects on worker outcomes: no treatment-effect diffusion from treatment groups to control group because the workers work in isolation, and strict researcher control over the provision of the treatment since communication is done online. Additionally, these "gig worker" settings are becoming increasingly relevant for strategy and management scholars in their own right (Burtch, Carnahan and Greenwood 2016) .
The growth of online markets for contract labor has been rising at a fast pace. 26 Indeed, a 2016 Deloitte study indicated that 42 percent of executives anticipate an increase in the use of contingent workers in the next three to five years. A 2013 Accenture study predicted that future competitive advantage will hinge on "workers who aren't employees at all." Furthermore, it's not just entrepreneurial organizations that are leveraging online labor market platforms as sources of human capital: between 2016 and 2017, there has been over a 25 percent increase in the number of projects sourced via these platforms by Fortune 500 companies. 27 As there are few studies examining how employer-level characteristics influence the motivation of these non-traditional workers (Martins et al. 2004 ), this paper demonstrates that an employer taking a political stand on a social-political issue can influence the motivation and productivity of these workers.
From a practical perspective, this paper suggests that managers should be aware of their employees' stances on a given political or social issue prior to taking a public political stance on the issue, and should think twice about taking a stance that is incongruent with that of their employees. In the meantime, we would like to let you know that we will be changing our MTurk requester name next month to {ommitted} at the recommendation of our CEO.
In the meantime, we would like to let you know that we will be releasing a statement denouncing President Trump's decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. The CEO of this organization does not agree with President Trump's view on climate change.
In the meantime, we would like to let you know that we will be releasing a statement supporting President Trump's decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. The CEO of this organization agrees with President Trump's view on climate change. Also, though not directly relevant for your work with us, we wanted to let you know that our company will be changing its name in the near future. The CEO of this organization has decided to add the ending "Incorporated" to our company name.
Also, though not directly relevant for your work with us, we wanted to let you know that our company will be releasing a statement denouncing President Trump's decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement and his continued lack of leadership on the issue of climate change. In the meantime, we would like to let you know that we will be changing our MTurk requester name next month to {ommitted} at the recommendation of our CEO.
In the meantime, we would like to let you know that we will be releasing a statement denouncing President Trump's decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement and denouncing his stance on climate change. The CEO of this organization does not support President Trump's view on climate change.
In the meantime, we would like to let you know that we will be releasing a statement denouncing the withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement. The CEO of this organization believes that climate change is an important issue, and thinks that the issue of climate change requires immediate political action.
In the meantime, we would like to let you know that we will be releasing a statement supporting President Trump's decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement and supporting his stance on climate change. The CEO of this organization supports President Trump's view on climate change.
In the meantime, we would like to let you know that we will be releasing a statement supporting the withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement. Standard deviations reported in parentheses. P-value of the null tha the difference of means between the treatment group and control group equals 0 is reported in brackets. Based on independent sample t-tests. Statistically different characteristics noted in bold. 
